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The combination of cryptology and biometrics has emerged as promising component of information security. Despite the current
popularity of palmprint biometric, there has not been any attempt to investigate its usage for the fuzzy vault. This paper therefore
investigates the possible usage of palmprint in fuzzy vault to develop a user friendly and reliable crypto system. We suggest the
use of both symmetric and asymmetric approach for the encryption. The ciphertext of any document is generated by symmetric
cryptosystem; the symmetric key is then encrypted by asymmetric approach. Further, Reed and Solomon codes are used on the
generated asymmetric key to provide some error tolerance while decryption. The experimental results from the proposed approach
on the palmprint images suggest its possible usage in an automated palmprint-based key generation system.
Copyright © 2009 A. Kumar and A. Kumar. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
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1. Introduction
Hacking of the information is widely considered as one
of the potential attacks on any secure system. Authen-
tication systems should be designed to withstand such
attacks when deployed for critical security applications such
as e-commerce and accesses to restricted data/buildings.
Biometric-based authentication is considered as one of the
most secured systems whenever high privacy is demanded.
However, such authentication systems itself follow stepwise
procedural algorithms, like feature extraction, matching,
classification, and so forth, for authentication/verification
purposes [1]. As biometric templates are required at each
step, it increases the possibilities of intrusion at every
step and requires additional security management [2].
For instance, even a most secure authentication system is
not reliable if it cannot defy the attacks on the stored
database, or if an intruder can intercept the template features
generated from the biometric traits. Recent research eﬀorts
have developed some promising ideas to resist attacks on
biometric authentication system. One of such proposed
solutions is to cancel the tainted biometric features and
regenerate the new one for authentication purposes (also
known as cancelable biometric [3]). BioHashing technique
is frequently used to transform (noninvertible) biometric
template into some other representations using one-way
hash functions. This reissuance of the biometric templates
can withstand the attacks on stored templates and widely
accepted as a solution to the intrusion in extracted features.
The most acknowledgeable work in this area is to provide
cryptography-based security at diﬀerent stages of biometric
authentication. Cryptography is one of the most eﬀective
ways to enhance the security of the information system
via its encryption and decryption modules [4]. Even so,
the weakest link of cryptography-based security systems is
the associated secret key. While the simple memorized key
can be easily intercepted, a long and complex key needs
extra storage management like tokens, smart cards, and so
forth. Consequently, the smart card-based solutions came in
existence. To provide an aid to security, the cryptographic
keys are now stored somewhere (e.g., in a computer or
on a smart card) and released based on some alternative
authentication mechanism. The most popular mechanism
used for this purpose is password-based security [5], which
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is again a long string and diﬃcult to make secure, as now the
whole security depends upon the password given, used for
authentication.
As a solution, a secure encryption key can be associated
with a biometric signature to ensure the integrity and
confidentiality of communication in distributed systems.
Many of the limitations of the password and PIN-based
encryption schemes can be alleviated by using biometric
features, which are unique and can be conveniently extracted
from every user. The biometric-based encryption requires
physical presence of persons to be authenticated and is
therefore reliable, convenient, and eﬃcient. The encryption
keys can be generated using low-level combination of
biometric features and cryptology. Jules and Sudan [6] have
proposed the generation of a secure vault using an unordered
set, to lock any secret inside and referred it as fuzzy vault.
The concept of fuzzy vault has been further explored by
Uludag et al. [7], where they used fingerprint templates as
an unordered set to create the vault around the secret. They
further utilizes error correcting codes, such as Reed and
Solomon code to produce some error tolerance in the input
biometric templates, while decryption module.
However, the motivation to protect secret key involved
in cryptographic modules using biometric based fuzzy vault
can have several drawbacks due to diﬀerent cryptographic
approaches. While the symmetric cryptographic approaches
suﬀered authentication problems, asymmetric approaches
are computationally intensive (as further discussed in
Section 3). We, therefore, proposed the combination of
both symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic approaches
(which is referred to as double encryption in this paper) into
the fuzzy vault to meet high-security standard and utilize the
advantages of both approaches in a common domain. In the
recent years, biometric features such as face, iris, fingerprint,
hand geometry, palmprint, and signature have been sug-
gested for the security in access control. Most of the current
research in biometrics has been focused on fingerprint and
face. The recent research on face recognition has shown
some thorny problems regarding pose, lighting, orientation,
and gesture which made it less reliable as compared to
other biometrics. Fingerprint identification has successfully
implemented and widely accepted in most of the cases
for recognition purposes. However, it also has diﬃculties
regarding feature extraction. The fingerprint features are very
diﬃcult to extract from the elderly, laborer, and handicapped
users. As a result, other biometric characteristics are receiv-
ing increasing attention. Moreover, additional biometric
features, such as palmprint and hand geometry, can be easily
integrated with the existing authentication system to provide
enhanced level of confidence in personal authentication.
We explored the usage of palmprint biometric to create
fuzzy vault. The prior works in this area is summarized
in Section 2, while the detail of the earlier cryptographic
approaches is presented in Section 3. Double encryption
is explored in Section 4. The proposed system is discussed
in Section 5. The experimental results from the performed
approach are summarized in Section 6. This section also
includes a summary of related prior work. Finally, the main
conclusions from this paper are summarized in Section 7.
2. Prior Work
The issue of nonrevocable biometric has been investigated
by Ratha et al. [3] by introducing the concept of cancelable
biometrics. Davida et al. [8] proposed majority decoding
and error correcting codes-based technique to generate the
cancelable biometric features. The approach is further uti-
lized using optical computation techniques in [9] and using
keystroke dynamics in [10]. Sautar et al. [9] were the first to
commercialize the concept in to their product bioscrypt. They
applied Fourier transform and majority coding to reduce
the feature variation. A predefined random key is locked by
biometric sample using phase angle product, and this prod-
uct can be further unlocked by other genuine biometrics.
The performance analysis is however not reported. Connie
et al. [11] used the concept of BioHashing by calculating
fisherprojections. However, the results shown by them are
based on the assumption that the generated token or keys
will be never stolen or shared. This is quite unrealistic and
creates doubts about real evaluation. The study of such
unrealistic evaluation has been presented by Kong et al. in
[12]. One of the innovative works proposed in this area is
by [2], where the authors utilized random orientation field
into the feature extractor to generate cancelable competitive
codes. The authors further considered all the three attacks
possible (template reissuance, replay attacks, and database
attacks) to provide a complete secure system. To protect
the generated cancelable competitive codes (replay attacks)
[2], the idea of one-time pad (OTP) ciphers is explored.
The OTP [13] is a symmetric cipher (same key is used for
both encryption and decryption) generated by applying XOR
between the randomly generated key and the plaintext. The
decryption can be done using the matched OTP and the
key (used for encryption). The advantage with OTP is that
each encryption is independent to the next encryption, and
random key can be used only once for encryption. Hence,
theoretically there is no way to break such encryption just by
analyzing a sequence of message. Although OTP encryption
has advantages over other encryption algorithms, still it has
some open issues like (i) the key involved for decryption
should be identical to encryption once and hence required
safe communication of key to the decrypting party [13]; (ii)
the number of bits in the key is same as in the plaintext
which makes the algorithm computationally ineﬃcient for
encrypting bulk data; (iii) one of the major requirements of
the algorithm is that not part or bit of the key should be
ever reused in any other encryption; otherwise it is easy to
break it [14]. ( Synchronized OTP generator can be employed
to counter such problems.) Authors in [15] proposed a new
cryptosystem by generating 1024 bits binary string, extracted
from the diﬀerential operations. The string is thenmapped to
128 bits encryption key using a Hash function. The approach
is novel and secure in many respects but still has issues to
resist against attack on generated encrypting key using Hash
function, as raised by Kong et al. in [12].
In most of the works proposed in literature of cancelable
biometrics, security of system depends upon the generated
unique code from a particular one-way hash functions. Thus
the system is secure till the unique code is not compromised
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and hence requires extra security management. Juels and
Sudan [6] have presented a promising model which was
an improvement on the prior study by Juel and Wttenberg
in [16]. They have produced a significant improvement
by modifying the Scheme of Davida et al. (in using error
correcting code size) [8] by introducing Reed and Solomon
error correcting coding theory in their fuzzy vault. Their
contribution is to hide any secret in fuzzy vault using
polynomial construction under unordered set. The secret
can be retrieved back by polynomial reconstruction, if
certain points of the unordered set can be known at
receiving end. The security of the scheme mainly depends
upon polynomial construction and reconstruction problem.
Uludag et al. [7] have combined the concept of fuzzy vault
with biometrics (fingerprint) by using biometric template
as an unordered set. Uludag and Jain [17] proposed to use
minutiae-based features from the fingerprints for locking
and unlocking the vault. However, this approach is limited
to its usage due to its inability to eliminate the inherent
variability in minutiae feature. Nandakumar et al. [18]
have attempted to eliminate such variability using helper
data and illustrated promising results. Hao et al. [19]
use iris biometric for generating cryptographic keys and a
combination of Reed and Solomon and Hadamard error
correcting theories for error tolerance. Calancy et al. [20]
proposed a smart card-based fuzzy vault that employed
fingerprints for locking and unlocking. The presumption
that acquired fingerprint images are prealigned is not realistic
and could be the possible reason for high false rejection
rate (30.0%) reported in the paper. Lin and Lai [21] have
done remarkable work in order to prevent repudiation but
their work still required smart card and password for better
implementation and hence reduces its usability. Recently,
a modified fuzzy vault scheme is proposed in [19] using
asymmetric cryptosystem. Having generated RSA public and
private keys, authors have used Reed-Solomon coding to
convert the keys in to codes. Further they used two grids,
one for codes and the other for biometric features. The
elements in the corresponding grids are in same positions.
The unlocking of vault only requires the knowledge of
the correct positions of the numbers in any of the grids.
However, this approach utilizes the asymmetric cryptosystem
and has all the problems associated with such systems.
Moreover, the database used for the experimental evaluation
is too small (9 users) to generate any reliable conclusion on
the performance. In summary, a diﬀerent range of biometrics
has been used for fuzzy vaults in literature. However, with
few notable exceptions, for example, [15, 19], with small
false rejection rates, the average FAR of 15% has been
cited.
In contrast to prior work in this area, we proposed [22]
fuzzy vault-based security to withstand the attacks on secret
key employing palmprint. The secret document/information
can be first encrypted using double encryption. The sym-
metric key approach can be easily employed to encrypt bulk
data. The attacks on security of symmetric key (secure com-
munication, authentication, as detailed in Sections 3.1.1 and
3.1.2 in this paper) are reduced by encrypting it again using
asymmetric cryptographic approach. Finally, the private key
of asymmetric approach (at the end of double encryption) is
protected by creating fuzzy vault around it. The approach is
to firstly employ double encryption to strengthen the security
system and reduce the shortcomings associated with both
symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic approaches and
finally to utilize the palmprint features to create fuzzy vault
around the key at the end of double encryption.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized
as follows. Firstly, this paper investigates a new approach
for fuzzy vault using palmprint biometric. Secondly, unlike
prior work in literature, this paper proposes a combined
cryptosystem which successfully exhibits the advantage of
both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography. It may be
noted that the asymmetric approach (RSA, named as initials
of Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman) for
encryption has been estimated to be very slow as compared to
traditional symmetric approach (Data Encryption Standard,
abbreviated as DES) [4]. Therefore the proposed approach
is to use symmetric cryptography to encrypt the entire
document and then we encrypted symmetric key using
asymmetric (RSA) approach. The palmprint-based fuzzy
vault is then constructed around decryption key. Finally,
we investigate the performance of the palmprint-based
cryptosystem on a large dataset and achieve promising
results.
3. Cryptographic Approaches
The objective of this work is to incorporate both symmetric
and asymmetric cryptographic approaches into the fuzzy
vault in order to ensure higher security and utilize the
advantages of both systems in a common domain. This
is referred to as double encryption. The approach is to
use symmetric key approach (DES) for encrypting the
secret document, and the generated symmetric key is again
encrypted by asymmetric approach (RSA). In the next
subsections, both symmetric and asymmetric approaches are
briefly introduced, and then the proposed approach utilizing
the combination of both approaches is discussed.
3.1. The Symmetric Cryptosystem. The symmetric approach
is most commonly used cryptosystem, as the system is
easy to implement and more importantly it has very fast
encryption speed [4]. Symmetric algorithms, such as, DES,
Triple DES, and Rijndael [4], provide eﬃcient and powerful
cryptographic solutions, especially for encrypting bulk data.
Let X = [x1, x2, x3, . . . , xm] be the secret message required
to be hidden by source A (Lucie). The m letters of message
are alphabets. The message is intended to B (Bryan). Lucie
generates its symmetric key, say KSim, and uses this key to
lock secret message X:
Y = KSim(X). (1)
She then sends the encrypted (locked) message and the
respective symmetric key (KSim) to B (Bryan). Receiver B
(Bryan) used the symmetric key to decrypt the message:
X = Ksim(Y). (2)
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In the presented work we have used advance encryption
standard (AES) as a symmetric cryptosystem, which is
advanced version of data encryption standard (DES). The
AES is symmetric key-based cryptosystem which is based
on the principle of block and substitution cipher. The AES
algorithm uses substitution boxes, polynomial matrices, and
symmetric key to convert a plain text to cipher text. These
are the parameter for AES cryptosystem and required to be
generated first before the encryption module [4]. Although
symmetric key algorithm is very fast and eﬃcient in bulk
data encryption, it can sometimes fail to ensure high-security
requirements. There are few shortcomings with the usage of
symmetric key cryptography. We now detail the problems
associated with symmetric key algorithms.
3.1.1. The Problems behind Authentication. Ensuring the
integrity of received data and verifying the identity of the
source of that data is of major concern to ensure the security
in data communication. A symmetric key can be used to
check the identity of the individual, as it requires the presence
of symmetric key, but this authentication scheme can have
some problems involving trust. The problem is that this
scheme cannot discriminate between the two individuals
who know the shared key. For example, any person having
control on Lucie’s private particulars can make any fraud
message to her pals by pretending himself as Lucie. This
not only allows intruder to do any unauthorized work in
place of Lucie but also creates problems for other related
persons. This uncertainty with symmetric approaches made
them useless whenever high confidentiality required in the
communication system. The above discussed issues can lead
to the position where there is no stand to deny if the disputes
were to arise. The relevant example is of repudiation when
Lucie’s friend renews the contract signed by Lucie without
telling her and repudiates from the fact by claiming that
someone else might have stolen the key from Lucie to sign
the contract. This concludes the key point that the com-
munication system must present nonrepudiation between
communicating parties. Themajor weakness with symmetric
approach is that they sometimes fail to authenticate persons
in communication.
3.1.2. The Problems behind Security of Key. The other
problem associated with this system is to ensure the security
of the involved symmetric key and how to exchange it safely.
The security of a signed document depends upon the secret
key involved as only secret key can ensure the decryption
of this document. Thus for a secure communication system
the secret key should be exchanged safely. One of the
shortcomings of the cryptographic approaches is that they do
not emphasize on key exchange problems. The asymmetric
approaches such as RSA, DSA, and ECC are very good
substitution of symmetric approach as it eliminates many of
its shortcomings. Both of the above discussed problems can
be alleviate by using asymmetric approach.
3.2. The Asymmetric Cryptosystem. The conventional sym-
metric cryptosystem is similar to a lockbox with a combi-
nation lock. This combination lock opens and closes with
one and the single combination, that is, the key that can
be used for both opening and closing the box. However,
the asymmetric approach uses a single lock that has two
distinct combinations, one for opening and one for losing.
This approach allows eﬀective control over who can place
or remove the contents in lockbox by assigning one of the
combinations as the secret and the other one as public. This
added flexibility oﬀers two distinct advantages: confidential-
ity without prior key exchange and the enforcement of data
integrity. Now for this approach, B generates a related pair
of keys: a public key Kpub and a private key Kpri. The Kpri
is known only to B, whereas Kpub is publicly available to
everyone and therefore accessible byA also.With themessage
X and the encryption key Kpub as input, A forms the cipher
text, denoted as Y , as follows:
Y= Kpub(X),
Y = [y1, y2, y3, . . . , ym
]
.
(3)
The intended receiver in the position to matching is able to
invert above using the following transformation:
X = Kpri(Y). (4)
In this work, we have used RSA cryptosystem which is the
most commonly used asymmetric approach. A traditional
RSA algorithm [23] requires two randomly generated prime
numbers [24]. For the security of RSA algorithm, the prime
numbers should be bigger (512 bit in our case) and randomly
chosen. Any secret encrypted using public key can only be
decrypted by using private key and vice versa. The main
points involved in encryption and decryption are as follows.
Lucie does the following:
(1) obtains the recipient Bryan’s public key,
(2) represents the plaintext message as a positive integer,
(3) computes the ciphertext,
(4) sends the ciphertext to Bryan.
Recipient Bryan does the following:
(1) uses his private key to compute positive integer,
(2) extracts the plaintext from the integer representative.
Using RSA algorithm, asymmetric cryptosystem can be
employed to solve a number of problems regarding symmet-
ric cryptographic approach. But as compared to symmetric
approach, asymmetric approach also has few drawbacks.
3.2.1. The Problems behind RSA. The private and public key
approach of RSA cryptosystem can be substitute of the key
exchange problem involved with symmetric approaches, but
the major problem regarding this approach is the distri-
bution of public keys. Having signed the secret document
with Bryan’s secret key, Alice must ensure that the public
key available is really Bryan’s key but not of intruder Carol.
The management and security of private key is also a major
concern. The other important problem with asymmetric
cryptography is that the processing requires intense use of
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the central processing unit as it is computationally intensive
and requires a lot of mathematical computations. This may
be a real problem when several simultaneous sessions are
required. The asymmetric approaches like RSA, DSA, and
so forth are generally known to be slower (about 100
times slower) [4] than symmetric approaches like DES,
AES, and so forth. As a conclusion one can argue that the
symmetric cryptography is highly suitable for encrypting
and decrypting the bulk of messages on data lines. However,
the associated problem of providing all the recipients with an
advanced copy of secret key can be expensive and hazardous.
The insecurity associated with the distribution of all the
necessary secret keys to all the recipients on a regular basis
is very high. In summary, working with RSA cryptosystem
can certainly eliminate several drawbacks associated with
symmetric approaches. However, this cryptosystem still has
some problems regarding complexity of algorithm as it works
very slowly (whenever a bulk data encryption is required)
due to the fact that it is mathematically intensive and requires
extra management for public keys.
4. Double Encryption
One way to alleviate above discussed problems associated
with the symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic appro-
aches is to use double encryption. A secret message is
encrypted using fast symmetric algorithm; the secret key
is then encrypted using asymmetric cryptography; the
Ciphertext (encrypted message) and the encrypted keys
are finally sent to the recipient. Asymmetric cryptography
is slow (computationally intensive), but not too slow to
encrypt such a small (as compared to secret message) bits
as a symmetric encryption key. Upon receipt, the recipient
can easily use his/her private asymmetric key to decrypt
the symmetric key. Further that symmetric key can be
used to quickly decrypt the message file. This idea not only
resolves the problem using both approaches but is also more
computationally sound.
4.1. Why Double Encryption? Most of the problems re-
garding symmetric/asymmetric approaches can be re-
medied using double encryption. The advantages of the
symmetric approaches are utilized to encrypt bulk of the
data, while asymmetric approaches are used to provide
authentication/verification to secure communication (as
discussed in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 symmetric approaches
are sometimes fail in authentication purposes). Using
double encryption, a message (may be bulk data) can
be encrypted by symmetric key approach, while the key
is again encrypted by public/private keys of asymmetric
approach. Once the message is encrypted by public key of
recipients, it can only be decrypted by its private key. This
ensures a safe communication between the source and the
verified/authenticated recipient. On the other hand, if the
message is encrypted by private key of the recipient, it can
only be decrypted by corresponding public key (which is
publicly available). This process authenticates the source of
encryption and therefore prevents any possible repudiation
or denial from the message generator.
4.2. Prior Work in Double Encryption. The concept of double
encryption is not new in cryptographic literature [25–27].
However, most of the related work is centered on the
implementation of cryptographic encryption and decryption
modules [28–30]. Some of these notable eﬀorts can now
be outlined. Nishimura et al. [25] in their recent European
patent have detailed the concept of encrypting symmetric key
with public and private keys of asymmetric approach. Their
developed approach ensures that when a doubly-encrypted
message is received, it is sent by a particular/authenticated
user; also the recipient of this message is a specific/verified
user(s). Doh et al. [31] have presented double encryption-
based optical security system. They have utilized the facial
images by using random-phase patterns in the spatial
plane and the Fourier plane and a personal information
image consisting of a personal identification number (PIN).
With the recognition of PIN, the authentication of the
encrypted personal identification card has done by primary
classification and recognition of the PIN with the proposed
multiplexed MACE phase-encrypted filter. In this technique,
the possibility of spoofing is significantly decreased using
the double-identification process. Z. Liu and S. Liu [32]
proposed Double image encryption based on iterative frac-
tional Fourier transform. They used to encrypt two diﬀerent
images into a single one simultaneously by their amplitudes
of fractional Fourier transform with diﬀerent orders.
In contrast to proposed double encryption schemes,
we explored this concept for fuzzy vault. The combina-
tion of cryptographic algorithms with biometrics has been
presented in several prior publications, for example, [2,
15, 17–19]. Some of these attempts have been focused to
hide the secret information in biometric-based fuzzy vault
[17, 18] while others used to generate cryptographic keys
using biometrics ([15, 19]) to hide the secret information.
Our contribution to literature is that we attempt to hide
secret information using double encryption (via symmetric
and asymmetric cryptographic approaches). In order to
strengthen the cryptographic approaches, we closed the
asymmetric key (at the end of double encryption) by creating
palmprint-based fuzzy vault around it. Our scheme is quite
unique in the sense that, it overcomes any dependency on
generated secret key (like [11, 33]) in cryptographic approaches
and utilized the unique palmprint features to create the fuzzy
vault.
4.3. Motivation to Fuzzy Vault. One of the most important
applications of double encryption is that it can overcome
many of the problems associated with the symmetric key
approach (as the symmetric key is again encrypted by
asymmetric approach). In addition, the level of security
oﬀered by the resulting asymmetric key, at the end of double
encryption, is very high and desired to secure the entire
system. In the cryptographic literature, security of asymmetric
key (at the end of double encryption) is generally questioned as
the main/key weakness of the double encryption [28]. In the
proposed approach, we have utilized the concept of fuzzy
vault to overcome this shortcoming of double encryption
by locking the private key in the vault. This combination
of double encryption with biometrics (fuzzy vault) can
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overcome most of the weaknesses regarding symmetric and
asymmetric cryptographic approaches.
5. Proposed System
Let X denote the dummy message to be encrypted and let
Ksim be the symmetric key, used to encrypt the document.
In order to encrypt the message X, the symmetric key can
be generated using AES algorithm. Let the symmetric key
be denoted by Ksim. Now for making system more secure
and overcome the diﬃculties of symmetric key approach,
(key exchange problem, confidentiality, etc.) the generated
symmetric key again is encrypted by asymmetric approach
using RSA algorithm. Let the public and private keys
associated with the RSA cryptosystem are denoted by Kpub
and Kpri. We will use this generated public key Kpub for
encryption and the generated private key Kpri for decryption.
Equation (5) summarize the complete procedure:
Y = Ksim(X),
T = Kpub(Y),
Y = Kpri(T),
X = Ksim(Y).
(5)
Figure 1 illustrates the complete block diagram and includes
all the key steps in the double encryption algorithm. For
the traditional RSA cryptosystem, the public key has made
publicly available while private key has kept private. The
cipher text has been generated with the publicly available
encryption key while it is decrypted with the private key kept
private. The security of the system depends upon the secrecy
of private key.
5.1. Palmprint-Based Fuzzy Vault. One of the key objectives
of this work is to investigate the usage of palmprint
biometric in the development of a cryptographic construct.
The palmprint-based cryptosystem can have higher user
acceptance and performance. Despite the recent popularity
of palmprint-based systems [34–36], there has not been
any attempt to investigate its usage for the fuzzy vault.
The palmprint literature has cited number of advantages
of palmprint biometric: (i) due to large surface area, the
region of interest for palmprint is larger as compared to
fingerprint and hence more features can be extracted, (ii) the
chances of damaged hand are less than damage fingerprint
for a person, (iii) even the presence of very less amount
of dirt or grease can aﬀect the performance of fingerprint
verification, but having little eﬀect in case of palmprint, and
importantly (iv) higher user acceptance for palmprintmainly
due to the stigma of fingerprints is associated with criminal
investigations.
The double encryption method detailed in previous
section incorporates both the ideas of symmetric and
asymmetric cryptosystem eﬃciently and minimizes most
of the shortcomings associated with both approaches. The
other important concern of the system is the management
of private key, as at the end of double encryption security
of the entire system depends upon the security of private
decryption key. The security to private key can be ensured
by the use of well-known concept fuzzy vault detailed in
[6]. Using the concept of fuzzy vault, our main goal is to
hide this decryption key using biometric features to provide
some security to the decryption key and make the whole
system tailored for its practical usage. The combination of
cryptographic keys with biometric oﬀers several advantages
including the fact that this removes the extra key manage-
ment eﬀorts required by the user and ensures that it is
nontransferable. This method of protecting the private key
not only makes the usage of smart cards redundant but also
makes the user self dependent for its key. The diﬃculties lie
in the fact that the cryptographic algorithm expects that the
keys should be highly similar for every attempt for successful
access, but it is clearly not the case with a typical biometric.
The key is to use suitable coding theory scheme which can
tolerate errors. We have used Reed and Solomon (RS) coding
scheme for providing some error tolerance while decryption.
This error tolerance is essentially required to handle inherent
variations in palmprint (biometric) features from the same
user during decryption. These variations can be attributed to
the scale, orientation, and translational variations in the user
palmprint due to peg-free imaging. The RS coding scheme
has error correcting capacity of (n − k)/2, where n is the
length of code and k is the length of message, and used to
encode decryption key Kpri.
We can easily vary (k,n) during the training stage/phase
and achieve the best possible combination for minimum
false acceptance and rejection rates. The proposed design
of palmprint vault is quite similar as for the fingerprint
[37]. Let the codes generated by R-S coding theory be of
size b. Then we generate a grid of size b × 3 such that
ith row of grid contains ith place. The rest two places are
filled by random numbers generated during encoding. We
designate this grid as grid F. Further, a grid of same size
is generated, and the biometric features are placed at the
same position as in the case of RS codes. The rest of the
two places are filled with numbers such that each row is
maintained in the arithmetic progression. Let us designate
these numbers as tolerance value. These points are actually
the chaﬀ points making the grid fuzzy. We called this grid
as grid G. To unlock the vault we only need to know the
correct positions of the elements in grid G, which can be
achieved by comparing the input palmprint features with
all the numbers in the corresponding row. Taking minimum
of the distance, we can conveniently locate the positions of
actual biometrics from grid F and hence the corresponding
positions for the codes in grid G. The idea of generating such
random numbers to combine with biometric templates is
somewhat similar to as discussed in [2]. However, in contrast
to [2], our approach is to add the tolerance value to the
feature vectors. Out of the three places on the grid G, only
one place is filled by original feature, and the rest two places
are filled by original features added with tolerance value.
The work presented in [2] has been motivated from the
random orientation field, which is inserted into the feature
extractor to generate noise-like feature codes. The inverse
Reed and Solomon codes are used to decode the codes. One
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can select the suitable values for n and k to control the error
occurred due to the variability in palmprint features. The
motivation behind choosing the tolerance for the palmprint
features is to make them fuzzy such that an imposter is not
able to predict the feature vector just at random. The block
diagram for locking the vault using palmprint features is
shown in Figure 2. The corresponding unlocking mechanism
is illustrated in Figure 3. Once the procedure for the locking
and unlocking of vault is determined, we fix the criteria
for the genuine users to successfully open the vault while
rejecting the imposter attempts. The vault is said to open
successfully, if the codes retrieved from grid F (created by R-S
codes) using the query palmprint features will be identically
equal to the codes used at the time of locking. The inverse R-
S codes can be applied to the retrieved codes to get back the
original symmetric decryption key. Finally, this decryption
key should successfully decrypt the secret private RSA key.
5.2. Feature Extraction and Normalization. The palmprint
features employed in this work were extracted from the
palmprint images acquired from the digital camera using
unconstrained peg-free setup in indoor environment. The
extraction of region of interest, that is, palmprint, from the
acquired images is similar as detailed in [38]. The Discrete
Cosine Transform (DCT) is used for the characterization
of unique palmprint texture. The DCT is highly compu-
tationally eﬃcient and therefore suitable for any online
cryptosystem. ( DCT is the basis of JPEG and several other
standards (MPEG-1, MPEG-2 for TV/video, and H-263 for
video-phones).) As illustrated in Figure 4, each of the 300 ×
300 pixels palmprint image is divided into 24 × 24 pixels
overlapping blocks. The extent of this overlapping has been
empirically selected as 6 pixels. Thus we obtain 144 separate
blocks from each palmprint image. The DCT coeﬃcients
from each of these N square block pixels, that is, f (x, y), are
8 EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing
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Figure 4: Localization of 144 overlapping palmprint image subblocks for feature extraction.
obtained as follows:
C(u, v) = ε(u)ε(v)
N−1∑
x=0
N−1∑
y=0
f
(
x, y
)
cos
[
πu
2 ·N (2x + 1)
]
,
× cos
[
πv
2 ·N
(
2y + 1
)
]
,
where u, v = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1,
ε(u) = ε(v) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
√
2
N
for u /= 0,
√
1
N
for u = 0.
(6)
The standard deviation of DCT coeﬃcients, obtained from
each of the overlapping blocks, is used to characterize the
region. Thus we obtain a feature vector of 144 values. High
degree of intraclass variability in the palmprint features,
mainly due to peg-free imaging, poses serious problems
in the unlocking of the constructed vault by the genuine.
The variability in feature vectors has been reduced with
the help of Z-rule normalization. Corresponding to each
feature vector, the training images are normalized, and then
their mean and standard deviations are used for feature
normalization in the test phase. This normalization reduces
the interclass variability of the extracted features and very
much helpful in fixing the tolerance for fuzzy vault.
6. Experimental Results
The implementation of the system consists of generation
of RSA cryptosystem. A dummy document is then double
encrypted using symmetric and asymmetric keys. After
double encryption, fuzzy vault is created around the private
key by generating grids using R-S codes and palmprint
features. The evaluation is based on varying tolerance value
over the range, and the corresponding false acceptance rate
(FAR) and false rejection rate (FRR) are then computed.
The palmprint database consisted of the left-hand images
from the 85 users, and two images from each of the users
are employed. The first enrolled palmprint image from each
of the users was employed to lock the vault. The successful
opening with the second enrolled palmprint image of the
same user was considered as genuine match while opening
with all the other enrolled test images from other enrolled
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Table 1: Summary of experimental results.
Key length EER (%) Tolerance
306 0.905 1.060
307 0.375 0.995
308 0.752 1.065
309 2.134 1.118
users (i.e., 84 users) was considered as imposter matches.
Thus our performance estimation, that is, FAR and FRR,
is based on 84 × 85 imposter and 85 respective genuine
attempts. The decisions from the FAR and FRR depend upon
choice of tolerance. We performed several experiments to
select the best value of this tolerance. Figure 5 illustrates
the performance of the proposed palmprint-based vault.
Figure 5(a) illustrates the variation of FAR and FRR scores
with the tolerance while Figure 5(b) illustrates the receiver
operating characteristics (ROC). The RSA cryptosystem used
in our program has some variations in key length [39].
The RSA implementation has utilized the string format to
generate the RSA keys, and its length varies from 306 to
309 (detailed in Section 6.1) [26]. As cryptographic keys are
supposed to be same at each application, authentication rates
can vary with each length size of the generated key. Table 1
illustrates the variation in experimental results (equal error
rate) with the key length and the corresponding tolerance
value.
6.1. Discussion. While the idea of incorporating biometrics
within cryptographic constructs has shown promising results
than password-based authentication, the system still has
open issues. The biometric modalities investigated for the
experimental evaluation has been quite limited and most of
the prior work is focused on fingerprint. Recently, iris [19],
face [33], and signature [40] have also been investigated and
yielded promising results. However, summary of prior work
presented in Table 2 suggests that much of the work has been
simulated on a small dataset, such as [37] has used 9 users,
[41] has used 10 users, and [9] has used 20 users, which is
quite small to generate a reliable conclusion on performance.
Despite the current popularity of palmprint biometric,
there has not been any attempt to investigate its usage for
the fuzzy vault. This paper [22] therefore investigated the
possible usage of palmprint in fuzzy vault to develop a
user friendly and reliable crypto system. The image dataset
used for the experiments (85 users) was acquired from
unconstrained peg-free setup as such images are more
realistic and expected to show large variations.
Our experimental results illustrated the EER up to about
0.3%while achieving the FRR of 0% at 0.35% FAR. However,
these results may be less convincing as other approaches
[2, 15]; our system is more reliable and robust, as far as
attacks on secret key are concerned. The experimental results
in BioHashing are dependent upon security of tokenized
(pseudo)randomnumber, as reported in [12] and have to put
additional eﬀorts to secure these numbers. In contrast, our
emphasis is to strengthen the cryptographic approaches for
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Figure 5: (a) The variations of the FAR and FRR characteristics
with the tolerance for the palmprint-based cryptosystem, and (b)
corresponding receiver operating characteristics.
encryption (the problems with symmetric and asymmetric
approach have been discussed earlier in Sections 3.1.1-3.1.2)
and withstand the attacks on secret key. Any secret docu-
ment/information (of any length) can be encrypted by sym-
metric cryptographic approach (as symmetric approaches
such as, DES, and AES are very eﬃcient for the encryption of
bulk data) and the secret symmetric key is again encrypted
using asymmetric approach (to overcome dependency on
secret symmetric key). Finally, the palmprint-based fuzzy
vault is created around the private asymmetric key to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of the key. At the decryption end,
if the input palmprint template is able to open the vault
(using matching criteria), the access to private key is granted.
The rest is the conventional cryptographic mechanism as the
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Table 2: Summary of related prior work.
Biometric Feature Error Correction Code FRR (%) FAR (%) Reference Database Size
fingerprint Minutiae Points RS Code 5 0 [42] 9 Users
Voice Cepstrum coeﬃcient Discretization 20 NA∗ [41] 10 Users
Signature Dynamic time wrapping Feature coding 28 1.2 [40] 25 Users
Iris Gabor Feature RS code and Hadamard Codes 0.47 0 [19] 70 Users
Fingerprint Fourier transform Majority code 12 35 [33] 20 Users
Fingerprint Minutiae point RS code 30 NA [17] NA∗
Fingerprint Minutiae points and helper data RS code 3 0.24 [18] 100 Users (FVC ’02)
Palmprint DCT features RS code 0 0.4 — 85
∗NA—Not Available.
private key is used to decrypt symmetric key and finally the
secret document. In fact, we propose a mixed cryptosystem
which has advantage over both symmetric and asymmetric
cryptography. The advantage of the proposed system lies
in that it not only attempts to alleviate the shortcomings
of symmetric key-based cryptosystem but also solves the
problems involved in asymmetric key-based approach. The
approach minifies dependency on secret key involved and
alternatively investigates a more secure and promising sys-
tem, as compared to BioHashing-based techniques.
Performance of the proposed system depends upon
choice of tolerance chosen for grid of palmprint features.
The increase in tolerance could lead to wrong positions in
grid, and hence even the genuine user cannot open the vault,
which can result in unacceptably high false rejection rate.
The low tolerance value could diminish the fuzziness of grid
which can cause the imposters to be accepted and hence
increase in false acceptance rate. The optimal range for toler-
ance value is dependent on the range of palmprint features.
The main consideration is on the construction of
palmprint-based fuzzy vault around the private key. The
private and public keys are generated on publicly available
RSA toolbox [26]. The bit length of modulus m = k ∗ l,
where m, k, and l are prime numbers (Section 3.1.5), is
chosen as 1024 bits, and length of the encryption exponent
n is 64 bit. The two large primes are chosen to be 512 bits,
so that 1024 bit RSA modulus m can be generated. The RSA
implementation has utilized the string format to generate
the RSA keys and its length varies from 306 to 309 which is
equivalent to 1015 to 1024 in binary bits. For the used RSA
cryptosystem, the private key sc should be chosen such that
it satisfies the following equation:
n∗ sc ≡ 1 (mod si), where 1 < sc < si. (7)
It can be observed from the above equation that more than
one value of n can satisfy the congruence, and hence the
length of the generated string (key) can vary. The prime
numbers are randomly chosen and so are the values of si
and n, and therefore the variations in length of keys are
not controlled. In our experiments we have observed and
accounted for this variation. Our implementation stores
the fixed length key and loads it at the time of generating
grids to construct the vault. Therefore Table 1 illustrated all
the possible variations in key length and the corresponding
performance (EER) with the tolerance value. It can be
observed from this table that as the key length varies (in
the range 306 to 309), the system has diﬀerent equal error
rates at diﬀerent tolerances. The minimum equal error rate is
achieved when the key length is 307.
7. Conclusions
This paper has investigated a new approach to construct
the cryptographic vault using palmprint features. In order
to combine cryptography with palmprint features we have
also incorporated the implementation of double encryp-
tion. This can eﬃciently reduce the possibility of hacking
within a cryptosystem. The experimental results presented
in Section 6 illustrate that the palmprint-based cryptosystem
can operate at low EER (0.375%). The summary of the prior
work, presented in Table 2, suggests that the palmprint can
be used as a promising biometric in the construction of a
cryptosystem. However, the work presented in Table 2 is not
directly comparable; our motivation is to mere outline the
eﬀectiveness of the proposed work. The cryptosystem investi-
gated in this paper employed localized spectral features from
the palmprint. The multiple feature representation, such as
detailed in [34], can oﬀer more reliable characterization
of features, and therefore cryptosystem based on multiple-
palmprint representation can be considered for the extension
of this work.
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